



DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script Friday, September 25, 2015

Sign In to Facility

POT

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (PST)
1	FO has all participants sign in on Facility Sign-In Sheet before entering the Key Management Facility.	11	9:49
2	FO reviews emergency evacuation procedures and other relevant information with participants.	14/	9:49 M
3	FO collects cell phones, laptops, etc. Cameras are permitted in the Key Management Facility. SC is allowed to use his laptop.	11	9:50 A/
4	FO verifies the functioning of audio and video recording.	1/	9:50A

Enter the Key Management Facility

POt

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (PST)
5	As the participants enter the Key Management Facility, the EW verifies the identity of each by examining a government-issued photo identification, notes the type and number of each piece of identification, and the participant's entry time on the Participant Signature Sheet. Note that participants do not sign the sheet until the end of the ceremony. As the participants are identified, the identification placards are distributed.	1)	9:51/p

j

PPT **Ground Rules**

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (75T)
6	CA previews ground rules and break procedures with participants.		
	- We follow the script step by step.		
	- Each step is read aloud by CA prior to it being performed.	11	ar
	- When a step is complete, it is announced that it is complete plus the time.		7:30
	- If a participant disagree, it is important to speak up, so everyone agrees that things are done properly.		
	- Questions and suggestions for improvement are welcome.		

Verify Time and Date

POT			
	Time (PS1)		
	9'59		
	7 7		

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (PST)
	EW reads aloud and records the date (month/day/year) and time (UTC) using an NTP-synchronized clock visible to all. Participants verify that the time is correct. Date:	1	9.'59
	This and all subsequent entries into this script and any associated logs should follow this common source of time.		

Verify UPS

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
8	If there is a UPS (uninterruptible power supply), then	,	
	- CA makes sure the UPS is connected to the electric grid and that it is charged.	\mathcal{N}	1700
	- CA also makes sure that the audio recorder is plugged into the UPS.	7	

Remove Equipment from Safe

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
9	SC opens safe and makes entry in log sheet indicating opening of safe.	1/	17:02
10	SC collects the following items from the safe:		
	- KSK-HSM-01B-SJC HSM		
	- boot-DVD	, 1	
	- laptop	0	17:47
	and any other items that may be scheduled for removal indicating removal of each with corresponding TEB number in the safe log. SC also provides any necessary power supplies and cables. Equipment is placed on table visible to all partipants.	1	,
	If the key ceremony prior to this one was in this facility, the HSMFD is also collected from the safe. If the key ceremony prior to this one was not performed in this facility, any HSMFD from the previous key ceremony is then produced in it's TEB, having been brought in by one of the participants.		
11	CA reads out KSK-HSM-01B-SJC HSM TEB and serial number while EW checks that it matches the TEB # recorded in the script from the previous key ceremony. TEB# A3112578 Serial# K1011066	1/	17:46
12	CA similarly reads out boot-DVD, laptop, and HSMFD TEB numbers while EW checks that they match the TEB # in the script from the previous key ceremony. DVD TEB# A28410793	1/	17:46
	Laptop TEB# A3112579	//	
	HSMFD TEB# A28410771	77004	

Collect OP Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
13	CA collects OP cards from COs, reading out and comparing TEB numbers with those recorded in the prior ceremony, reproduced for convenience in the appendices of this document. Different COs may appear on different pages. Note any discrepancies. CA places the OP cards in plain view on the table, removing cards from TEBs, discarding used TEBs but saving warning slips for reuse.	1	17,55

Set Up Laptop

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
14	CA takes boot-DVD and laptop out of their TEBs.		
	CA places the boot-DVD and the laptop on the table, connects laptop power to the UPS, external monitor power can be plugged to grid power or the UPS (if the UPS is considered big enough).	,1	18:04
	When these items are powered on, boot the laptop using the DVD.	1/	101
	During the boot process, make sure the output on the laptop screen is also sent to the external monitor/projector.	7	
	Booting from CD may generate warnings of kernel crash, which can be ignored if it keeps on booting.		
15	CA logs in as root.	1.	18:04
16	CA opens a terminal window.	"4/	18:05

		No.	
17	CA verifies the time zone, date, and time on the laptop and synchronizes it if necessary.		
	Display the current time and timezone:		
	date		
	If the timezone is not set to UTC:		
	cd /etc/		
	rm localtime	A	
	ln -s /usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC localtime		16120
	Set time to match the wall clock:	1/}	18,08
	date mmddHHMMYYYY		
	Verify:		
	date		
18	CA disables screen saver by typing		
	xset s off		
	(while sleep 1800;do xset -dpms;done&)		
	Then closes the window by typing		
	exit	11	1010
	Now, using the GUI menu, in		1841-
	"System" -> "Preferences" -> "Screensaver"	' ' /	
	uncheck "activate screen saver when computer is idle"		
	Click "Close". In		
	"System" -> "Preferences" -> "More Preferences" -> "Power Management"		
	Ensure both sliders in "Running on AC" are set to "never".		
	Click "Close".		
19	CA opens a terminal window, which we will refer to as the "checksum window". In this window CA starts the calculation of the sha256 checksum of the boot-DVD. This takes about 9 minutes to complete. This step is complete after issuing this command.	H	18:10
	sha256sum /dev/cdrom	. 1	
20	CA connects USB hub to laptop.	11	18:11

21 CA removes HSMFD from the TEB, connects it to the laptop, and waits for O/S to recognize the FD. CA lets participants view contents of HSMFD then closes FD window.	18:13
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Start Logging Terminal Session

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
22	CA opens a new terminal window, which we will refer to as the "command window". In this new window CA will change the default directory to the HSMFD and starts capture of terminal output to a file: cd /media/HSMFD script script—20150925.log	1	18:14

Start Logging HSM Output

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
23	CA inspects the HSM TEB for tamper evidence and removes it from TEB; discards TEB and plugs ttyUSB0 null modem serial adaptor and cable to the back.	4	18:15
24	CA connects the HSM to the laptop using the USB serial adapter.	1/	18:16
25	CA opens a new terminal window, which we will refer to as the "ttyaudit window". In this window the CA will start logging HSM serial port output by executing	11,	18:17
	cd /media/HSMFD ttyaudit /dev/ttyUSB0		1
	Note: DO not unplug USB serial port adaptor from laptop as this causes logging to stop.	•	

Verify DVD checksum

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
26	In the "checksum window" CA uses the "hexread" program to have the sha256 checksum of the boot-DVD read aloud by the laptop.		
	hexread		
	CA will copy/paste the checksum into the "hexread" program at the appropriate prompt.		
	If the use of the "hexread" program does not sound properly, CA will read aloud himself, four digits at a time.	A	18.21
	EW verifies that the checksum of the boot-DVD is the following:		
	7DE4 31F9 C33D DFEF		
	9089 AB56 13A3 8126		
	708A 3AC1 A784 38A7		
	B9C9 2A4F 52A1 F87C		
	Other participants may compare this with the boot- DVD checksum calculated during Key Ceremony 6, reproduced for convenience in the appendices of this document.		
	CA then closes the terminal window by typing		
	exit		

Connecting offline HSM (KSK-HSM-01B-SJC)

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
27	CA connects power to HSM. Status information will appear on the serial logging screen in the "ttyaudit window" and the "Ready" LED on the will HSM blink. After the self test the HSM display will have the text "Set Online" indicating that the HSM is in the initialized state. The "Ready" LED is off.	1)	18:24

Activate HSM

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
28	CA sets HSM online using the "Set Online" menu item and three (3) OP cards. The "Ready" LED should illuminate. Use OP cards 1, 4 and 5, and PIN 11223344. The HSM will always refer to cards 1, 2 and 3, regardless of our numbering (possibly) being different.	1)	87.28
29	CA connects Ethernet cable between laptop and HSM and tests network connectivity between laptop and HSM by entering ping 192.168.0.2 in the "command window" and looking for responses. Press Ctrl-C to stop the ping program.	11	8,'29
30	CA inserts flash drive labeled "SCRIPTS" into a free USB slot and waits for O/S to recognize the FD. When the new window for the mounted media appears, close that window.	1/	18:30
31	CA copies the compressed scripts from the drive labeled "SCRIPTS" and calculates the checksum of the tar-file. ls /media/SCRIPTS cp -p /media/SCRIPTS/scripts- 20150925.tar.gz .	1)	18:31
	sha256sum scripts-20150925.tar.gz		

Start generating Keys and Keybundles

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
32	CA copies shell scripts that will be used to generate new keys and bundles by executing:		
	tar -xzvof scripts-20150925.tar.gz		
	cp -p makeallhsmfiles /opt/dccom		
	cp -p exkey /opt/dccom	al	
	<pre>cp -p keybundle-generate.20141212 /opt/dccom</pre>	1	8:33
	mkdir /tmp/pch	1	
	cp -p 20150925.kc_script_gen.out /tmp/pch	•	
	cp -p /opt/dnssec/aep.hsmconfig /tmp/pch		
33	CA copies encrypted backups of the ZSKs by executing:	11	14177
	cd /tmp/pch		18,55
	makeallhsmfiles	••	
34	CA starts key and signature generation by executing:		
	keybundle-generate.20141212 < 20150925.kc_script_gen.out	11	
	The data file contains a line for each zone for which ZSKs will be rolled or a new zone will be generated. This will take a long time generating ZSKs and KSKs as necessary and creating keybundles (KSK signed DNSKEY RRsets). KSKs and ZSKs will automatically be backed up in encrypted form and deleted from HSM as each zone is completed. The backed up keys are stored in /tmp, which is a memory based file system.	4/	18,36
	This step is complete when the CA has issued the command above.		

Re-Package OP Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
35	CA places each OP card with pre-printed warning slip in its own new TEB and records the TEB # in the EW's copy of the smart card sign out sheet below, reading it aloud for verification and giving the TEB tear-off strip to the EW.	H	19:14

Re-Distribution of Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
	CA calls each CO to retrieve their smartcards. As each CO receives and inspects their cards, they verify, date and sign the EW's copy of the sign out sheet below and EW initials their entry.	18	19:20

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet

CO#	Card Type	TEB#	Printed Name	Signature	Date	Time	EW
CO1	OP 1 of 7	A28410724	Steve FELDMAN	Jan San San San San San San San San San S	9/25/15	1915	1
CO4	OP 4 of 7	A28410725	Eric ALLMAN	Sille	9/25/15	19:16	1
CO5	OP 5 of 7	A28410726	Stephan SOMOGYI	5500	9/25/15	19:16	V

Optionally leave facility

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
37	Optionally, all participants can now leave the room if the room is closed and sealed until everyone's return.	11	20:314

Pack and store Keys and Keybundles

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
38	CA waits for key generation script to complete.	1/	20:31
39	CA generates the archive destined for the signers by executing:	W	
	<pre>tar -cvzf /media/HSMFD/20150925.kb.tar.gz zsk*.hsm *.keybundle.tar.gz *.keybundle.tar.gz.sha256 2> errors</pre>	<i>n 1</i>	- 412(1
	The redirection of stderr to the "errors" file is to make possible error messages from the command execution easily noticable. This file should be empty:	1/	10:34
	cat errors		
	rm errors		
40	CA archives all results including encrypted KSKs for future use by executing:	//	
	tar -cvzf /media/HSMFD/20150925.session.tar.gz . 2> errors	7/	20,'34
	cat errors	' /	
	rm errors		_
41	CA creates a snapshot of any changes to DB files by executing:	11	
	cd /media/HSMFD	7//	20,35
	tar -czf 20150925.KSK-HSM-01B- SJC.db.tar.gz *.db	'/	20,30
42	CA calculates checksums of all files on the HSMFD:		,,,
	findtype f -print0 xargs -0 -n 50 sha256sum	1/	20'26
	If that command fails, the following will suffice instead:	11	20/36
	sha256sum *		
	Finally, to keep an eye on available space, execute:		
	df -h		

43	CA deletes the files on the SCRIPTS FD and unmounts by executing:		
	rm -rf /media/SCRIPTS/*	01	
	umount /media/SCRIPTS	1/	10:40
	and removes the SCRIPTS FD for reuse.	1	

Return HSM to a Tamper Evident Bag

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
44	CA presses RESTART button on the HSM and waits for self test to complete. CA then disconnects HSM from power and laptop (serial and Ethernet), placing HSM into a new TEB and seals.	1/	20:42
	CA reads out TEB # and HSM serial #, shows item to participants while EW records TEB # and HSM serial # here. TEB# A 412845 7 HSM Serial#: K1011066	1	20:44

Stop Recording Serial Port Activity

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
	CA terminates HSM serial output capture by disconnecting the USB serial adaptor from the laptop. CA then exits out of the "ttyaudit window".	11	20;44

Backup HSM Flash Drive Contents

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
47	CA displays contents of HSMFD by executing ls -ltr	1	20:45

48	CA plugs a blank FD labeled "HSMFD" into the laptop waits for it to be recognized by the O/S as HSMFD_ and copies the contents of the HSMFD to the blank drive by executing cp -Rp * /media/HSMFD_ CA then unmounts new FD using umount /media/HSMFD_ CA then removes HSMFD_ from the laptop and places it a new TEB and seals; reads out TEB # and shows item to participants while EW records TEB # here. TEB# A284/D7/9 This copy will later be stored in the on-site audit bundle.	1	20:57
49	CA repeats this activity a second time to create a second copy. TEB# A284107 20 This copy will later be stored in the off-site audit bundle.	1	20,59
50	CA repeats this activity a third time to create a third copy. TEB# A284/0721 This copy will later be stored in the EW audit bundle.	11	21:01
51	CA repeats this activity a fourth time to create a fourth copy. TEB# 1284/0722 This copy will later be placed in the safe.	11	21:02
52	CA repeats this activity a fifth time to create a fifth copy. TEB# A284/072 3 This copy will later be sent to the other KSK generating country.		21:04

Stop Logging Terminal Output

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
53	CA stops logging terminal output by entering "exit" in "command window".	1	20,48
54	CA calculates sha256 checksum of the logfile by executing. sha256sum script-20150925.log CA may choose to use the "hexread" program, and copy/paste, to read the hash of the checksum. EW records the sixty-four digit hash 666E 17D1 EB47 68B 9 2B5B 5D44 2AFF 979D A620 01EF 0100 F510 01CF 3126 A3BC 7/BA 04EE		20:53

Return HSMFD to a Tamper Evident Bag

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
55	CA unmounts HSMFD by executing		
	cd /tmp	1,	80
	then	1	21:05
	umount /media/HSMFD	1/	
56	CA removes HSMFD and places it in new TEB and seals; reads out TEB # and shows item to participants.	1/	21:07
	EW records TEB # here. TEB# 128410718	(/	

Return Boot-DVD to a Tamper Evident Bag

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
57	CA executes: shutdown -h now	- //	71:00
	removes DVD and turns off laptop.	1	21.07
58	CA places boot-DVD in new TEB and seals; reads out TEB # and shows item to participants.	11	2119
	EW records TEB # here. TEB# <u>A 2841071</u> 7	1	21:09

Return Laptop to a Tamper Evident Bag

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
	CA disconnects power, and any other connections from laptop and puts laptop in new TEB and seals; reads out TEB#; shows item to participants. EW records TEB # here. TEB# 128458	#	21:11

Return Power Supplies, USB Hub, and Cables

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
	CA places HSM power supply and laptop power supply, USB hub, USB serial adapter, power and networking cables in a bag. This need not be a TEB as it is only used for convenient packaging.	1	21:15

61	SC returns items to the safe. SC records return of each item on the safe log with TEB #, printed name, date, time, and signature with a second participant initialing each entry.		
	- KSK-HSM-01B-SJC HSM	, ,	
	- laptop		21/10
	- original HSMFD above	1/	21:/8
	- fourth HSMFD backup	1	~~~
	- DVD		
	Power supplies and cables need not go in the safe, but can be stored separately.	, 6	
62	SC closes safe. EW verifies it is locked.	1/	21:19

Sign-Out on Participant Signature Sheet

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
63	All participants leave the Key Management Facility, sign the Participant Signature Sheet, and note their exit time.	1/	2122
64	CA reviews EWs script and signs it. CA Signature	1/	21,'26

Sign Out of Facility

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (PST)
65	FO returns phones, laptops, and other items to participants and logs their exit times. Participants return identification vests to the FO. Participants are now free to depart.	11	2,26 p

Stop Audio-Visual Recording

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (PST)
66	FO stops audio and video recording.	1/1	2:26 Pr

Copy and Store the Script

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (PST)
67	EW makes at least 2 colour copies of his or her script: one for off-site audit bundle, one for on-site audit bundle, copies for other participants as requested, and retaining the original.		
	The two audit bundles each contain:		
	- output of signer system - HSMFD		
	- copy of EWs key ceremony script		
	- audio-visual recording		
	- logs from the Facility Physical Access Control	\	
	- SC attestation (A.2 below)		
	- the EW attestation (A.1 below)		
	all in a TEB labeled "Key Ceremony 09/25/2015", dated and signed by EW and CA. One bundle will be stored by the SC along with equipment. The second bundle will be kept securely offsite.		
	The "fifth copy" of the HSMFD will be sent to the other key signing facility.		
	CA keeps any remaining materials (e.g. extra HSMFD) for next key ceremony preparation and analysis.		

Appendix A:

Key Ceremony Script Attestation

(by EW)

I hereby attest that the Key Ceremony was conducted in accordance with this script and that any exceptions which may have occurred were accurately and properly documented on the attached Script Exception Forms.

Printed Name:

Signature:

Date: _

The company of the contract of

A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document. State of California County of San Mater before me, ___ personally appeared U; Name(s) of Signer(s who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument the person(s). or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument. I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct. LARRY W. JORDAN WITNESS my hand and official seal. Commission # 2024037 Notary Public - California San Mateo County My Comm. Expires Jun 7, 2017 Place Notary Seal Above OPTIONAL ' Though this section is optional, completing this information can deter alteration of the document or fraudulent reattachment of this form to an unintended document. **Description of Attached Document** Title or Type of Document: Document Date: Number of Pages: _____ Signer(s) Other Than Named Above: ___ Capacity(ies) Claimed by Signer(s) Signer's Name: Signer's Name: □ Corporate Officer — Title(s): □ Corporate Officer — Title(s): ___ ☐ Partner — ☐ Limited ☐ General ☐ Partner — ☐ Limited ☐ General ☐ Individual ☐ Attorney in Fact ☐ Individual ☐ Attorney in Fact ☐ Trustee ☐ Guardian or Conservator ☐ Trustee ☐ Guardian or Conservator ☐ Other: Other: Signer Is Representing: Signer Is Representing:

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Appendix B:

Access Control System Attestation

(by SC)

I have reviewed the physical access control system and not found any discrepancies or anything else out of the ordinary.

Attached is the audited physical access log.

Printed Name:

007 to 7-2

Date:

SAPT 25 201:



1600 Shattuck Avenue Facilities Sign-In Sheet

PDT

Role	Name	Signature	Date	Entry Time	Exit Time
FO	Peter ROWLAND			9:45	
CA	Robert MARTIN- LEGÈNE			9:46	
EW	Larry JORDAN			9,145	
CO1	Steve FELDMAN	Personally identifiable information red	lacted	9:45	
CO4	Eric ALLMAN	4		9:45	
CO5	Stephan SOMOGY			9:48	
SC1	Bill WOODCOCK			9:49	
R	Ashley JONES	0 000	0/L0/10	7.40	

Appendix C:

Abbreviations Used in This Document

Roles

CA **Ceremony Administrator**

EW **External Witness**

SC **Security Controller**

CO **Crypto Officers** FO **Facilities Officer**

R **Registry Representative**

Other Abbreviation

TEB

Tamper Evident Bag (MMF Industries, item #2362010N20 small or #2362011N20 large)

HSM Hardware Security Module

FD Flash Drive

AAK **Adapter Authorization Key**

SMK Storage Master Key

OP Operator

SO **Security Operator**

Appendix D:

Letter and Number Pronunciation

Character	Call Sign	Pronunciation
A	Alfa	AL-FAH
В	Bravo	BRAH-VOH
C	Charlie	CHAR-LEE
D	Delta	DELL-TAH
E	Echo	ECK-OH
F	Foxtrot	FOKS-TROT
G	Golf	GOLF
Н	Hotel	HOH-TEL
ı	India	IN-DEE-AH
J	Juliet	JEW-LEE-ETT
K	Kilo	KEY-LOH
L	Lima	LEE-MAH
M	Mike	MIKE
N	Novemb er	NO-VEM-BER
0	Oscar	OSS-CAH
P	Papa	PAH-PAH
Q	Quebec	KEH-BECK
R	Romeo	ROW-ME-OH
S	Sierra	SEE-AIR-RAH
T	Tango	TANG-GO
U	Uniform	YOU-NEE-FORM
٧	Victor	VIK-TAH
W	7-7-7-1-1	WISS-KEY
X	Xray	ECKS-RAY
Y	Yankee	YANG-KEY
Z	Zulu	Z00-L00
1	One	WUN
2	Two	TOO
3	Three	TREE
4	Four	FOW-ER
5	Five	FIFE
6	Six	SIX
7	Seven	SEV-EN
8	Eight	AIT
9	Nine	NIN-ER
0	Zero	ZEE-RO

Appendix: E

Card Distribution from Key Ceremony 1

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
103	Due to limited number of personnel at this key ceremony, cards will be distributed in groups that maintain multi-person control requirements. A subsequent key ceremony will redistribute cards to their final holders. Each group of cards shall be placed in another TEB whose numbers are recorded below on the EW's script.	11	8:371
104	SMK1, SD1, OP1 TEB#_A 2.1 0 9 4 9 8 6 go to CO1, Steve FELDMAN.	11	8:390
105	SMK5, SO5, OP5 TEB# A 2/1094 983 are entrusted to CO1, Steve FELDMAN, for conveyance to CO6, Stephan SOMOGYI	1/	8:43 PM
106	SMK2, SO2, OP2 TEB# A 7.10 9 4 9 8 5 go to CO2, Michael SINATRA.	1/	8:457
107	SMK3, SO3, OP3 TEB# A 2109 4984 go to CO3, Kim DAVIES.	1/	8:4610
108	SMK6, SO6, OP6 TEB# A 2 / D 9 4 9 8 2 are entrusted to CO3, Kim BAVIES, for conveyance to CO6, LEONG Keng Thai	11	8:48/1
109	SMK 4, SO4, OP4 TEB# A 2/0 94980 go to CO4, Jonny MARTIN.	4	8:49/m
110	SMK7, SO7, OP7 TEB# A 2.10 9 4 9 81 size entrusted to CO4, Jonny MARTIN, for conveyance to CO7, Gaurati UPADHAYA.	y	8:500

Appendix: F Smart Card Sign Out Sheet from Key Ceremony 1

	car	Card Type	TEB	Printed Name	Signature	Date	Time EW
	COI	GP1d7	A21095013	Steve FELDMAN	Br.	4/25/11	108041
-/	001	80 1 of 7	A21095012	Stove FELDMAN	ML	4/25/11	20.56 7/
_	CO1	SMK 1 of 7	A21095011	Shove FELDMAN	10-	4/25/11	20.56 7
	CO3	OP2d17	A21095010	Michael SINATRA	100 ACD	4/25/11	20155 1
1	000	SQ 2 of 7	A21095009	Michael SINATRA	MARSH	425/11	20:51-72
_	002	SMK 2 of 7	A21095008	Michael SMATRA	Markar B Sh	4/25/11	20153-7/
	cos	DP36F7	A21095007	File DAVIES		425/11	852 4
1	COS	S0 3 of 7	A210950 De	KAM DAVIES	6	4/25/11	852 7/
	CO3	SMK 3 at 7	A21095004	KIM DAVIES	Hel	425/11	882 1
	CO4	OP 4 df 7	121095005	Johny MAJITIN	1.mg	4/25/11	8.58 4
1	CO4		A21095003		JUR	40501	8:58
_	CO4	BMK 4 of 7	N 21013002		JAN.	4/25/11	8:58 4
	005	OP567	A21095001		the	425/11	20:50 7
1	COS	SO 5 of 7	A210 95000		Stra	4/25/11	2056 T
_	CDS	SMK S of 7	A 210 94999	Steve FELDMAN	100	4/25/11	20:84
	COS		A21094998	Kim DAVIES		405/11	853 1
l	006	90 6 of 7	A21094997	Kim DAVIES	440	425/11	5:53 1/
	100	OP 7 of 7	A21094996	Joney MARTIN		405/11	853 7
	007	507:47	121094995	See A.	Jill.	4/25/11	8:58 4
1	007		A21094994	Jonny MARTIN	dire.	425/11	8.58
-			A 21094 193	South MARTIN	JIML.	425/11	8:58 7

Appendix: G

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet from Key Ceremony 2

	DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script		Monday, May 30, 2011
	Smart Card Sign Out	Sheet	
w43	CON CHATUDO TERA	Printed Varie Signature	Date Tone EW
204	COT OF 147 A19204935	- Orange Marie State	100 TO 1/2
A1920444	001 501 #7 A1920493	M BRANG FELDRANG STATE	100ts 0047 1
1	CO1 BMK 1:17	Stove FELDMAN	500/11
A19204948	COS 00247 A1920493	3 Meran SHATHA ACCURACE	500011 DOLLAS 1
0/92	CO2 502017 A1420493	1 METHER SPEATER LUDELBS	k, 50071 Days
Who and the	COS SAM 2 of 7	Michael SINATRA	50011
10204112	004 OFZHT A19204932	. Somy MASTER - 1000 .	1000 Oxo 1
41920494M	004 80 401 A1920493	U . /T	100011 Coso 7
	004 SMK 4 (# 7	JOSEPH MODELLIN	530H
A19204941	000 0000 A19204929	I line the BOMOON	soon ass
Alas	000 SOLET A1920 4928	SMM SONOON SS-1	500m 0051 D
	COS SMK S at 7	SHAM SOMOON	500/H
	CD7 OP1d1	Jamy MATTIN	550/11
	CDT S0 Fet 1	Jerry MASTNs	5/30/11
	COT SMK T of F	Jersey MASSET III	50001
n 16	201101111	74	
A 19	204944 - C	1	
A192	0 4943 - 00) -	
A 192	0 4942 - 60	7	
A192	0 494/ (0.	>	
	Declar Classes 1		
	Packet Clearing House		Page 25 of 32

Appendix: H

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet from Key Ceremony 3

DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script

Monday, June 20, 2011

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet

co#	Card Type	TEB#	Printed Name	Signature	Date	Time	EW
CO1	OP 1 of 7	A 19204876	Steve FELDMAN -	the	6/20/11	67.51	1
соз	OP 3 of 7	A 14204874	Kim DAVIES	WK_	6/20/11	0751	N
CO4	OP 4 of 7	A14204872	Jonny MARTIN	J. Ull.	6/20/11	01:49	M
CO6	OP 6 of 7	A 16204870	LIM Choon Sai	-AR.	6/20/11	01.50	N
CO7	OP 7 of 7	A192248 68	Gaurab UPADHAYA	6	6/20/11	07.49	1

ENCLOSING BAGS:

CO1: A 19204875

CO3: A 19204873

CO 4: A19204871

CO 6: A19204869

607: A19204867

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Appendix: I

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet from Key Ceremony 4

DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script

Friday, January 20, 2012

Re-Package OP Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
60	CA places each OP card with instruction slip in its own new TEB and records the number in the smart card sign out sheet below.	1/	20:43

Re-Distribution of Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
61	CA calls each CO to return their smartcards. As each CO receives and inspects their cards, they fill out the sign out sheet below and EW initials their entry. Note new outer bags in sheet below.	1	70:51

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet

co#	Card Type	TEB#	Printed Name	Signature	Date	Time	EW
CO2	OP 2 of 7	A19204950	Michael SINATRA	WORS. SAL	1/20/12	2051	7
CO2	SO 2 of 7	A19204952	Michael SINATRA	welcols Sut	1/20/12	2051	7
CO4	OP 4 of 7	A19204949	Jonny MARTIN	chul	1/20/12	200	4,
CO4	SO 4 of 7	A19204953	Jonny MARTIN	Jan.	1/20/12	2049	1
CO5	OP 5 of 7	A19204951	Stephan SOMOGYL	Som	1/20/12	2046	4
	SO'5 of 7	A1904954	Stephan SOMOGYI	55	1/20/12	2076	1

OUTSIDE BAG

Packet Clearing House

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Appendix: J Smart Card Sign Out Sheet from Key Ceremony 5

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1

Appendix: K

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet from Key Ceremony 5-1

	Key Ceremony Script		Wednesday, May	30, 2012
Re-Distrib	bution of Cards			
Step	Ac	tivity	Initial Time	(UTC)
each out t	calls each CO to return h CO receives and ins the sign out sheet below. Note new outer bag	pects their cards, ow and EW initial	they fill //	7:14
Smart Ca	ard Sign Out Sheet			
CO# Gard 1	Type TEB#	Printed Name	Signature Date Ter	ne EW
CO1 OP 1 of	M 20 1100 27	Steve FELDMAN	State 5/30/12 19.1	11 4
CO1 SO 1 of		Steve FELDMAN	530/12 19:	11 7
CO2 OP 2 at	H 78410 8 50	Michael SINATRA	Wilmor Sac 5/30/12 /9:	12 7
COS SO 2 of	A28410825	Michael SINATRA	Inter 12 Set 530/12 19.	12/
CO4 OP 4 of	N 20110	Jonny MARTIN	JAlle . 5/30/12 /9:	14
CO4 50 4 of	A 28410823	Jonny MARTIN	J.M. 5/30/12 19	18 7

Appendix: L

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet from Key Ceremony 6

DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script Friday, July 27, 2012 Re-Distribution of Cards CA calls each CO to return their smartcards. As each CO receives and inspects their cards, they fill out the sign out sheet below and EW initials their 20:20 entry. Note new outer bags in sheet below. Smart Card Sign Out Sheet Date A284/08/6 CO1 OP 1 of 7 Steve FELDMAN CO1 20 CO4 OP 4 of 7 A28410814 7/27/12 A284/0817 CO5 OP 5 of 7 7/27/12 2019 Packet Clearing House Page 12 of 28


Appendix: M

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet from Key Ceremony 7

DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script Friday, December 14, 2012 Re-Package OP Cards Step Activity Initial Time (UTC) The CA places each OP card with pre-printed warning slip in its own new TEB and seals TEB. 20:44 hands the EW the tear-off strip from the TEB to record. Re-Distribution of Cards Step Activity Initial Time (UTC) The CA calls each CO to return their smartcards. As each CO receives and inspects their cards, they fill out the sign out sheet below and the EW initials their 20:46 entry. Smart Card Sign Out Sheet CO# Card Type TEB # **Printed Name** Signature Date Time CO1 OP 1 of 7 284/08 OF Steve FELDMAN CO2 OP 2 of 7 Michael SINATRA A284/0804 CO4 OP 4 of 7 A28410803 Jonny MARTIN Packet Clearing House Page 13 of 30

Appendix: N

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet from Key Ceremony 8




Appendix: O

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet from Key Ceremony 9

DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script Friday, January 10, 2014 Re-Package OP Cards Initial Time (UTC) Activity 35 CA places each OP card with pre-printed warning slip in its own new TEB and records the TEB # in the 18:15 EW's copy of the smart card sign out sheet below, reading it aloud for verification and giving the TEB tear-off strip to the EW. Re-Distribution of Cards Initial Time (UTC) Activity CA calls each CO to retrieve their smartcards. As each CO receives and inspects their cards, they verify, date and sign the EW's copy of the sign out sheet below and EW initials their entry. 18:18 Smart Card Sign Out Sheet COF Card Type Printed Name Date 18:16 Steve FELDMAN 1/10/14 CO1 OP 1 017 A28410774 A28410773 18:17 Michael SINATRA CO2 OP 2 of 7 18:17 A28410772 1/10/14 CO5 OP 5 of 7 Stephan SOMOGYI Optionally leave facility Activity Initial Time (UTC) Optionally, all participants can now leave the room if the room is closed and sealed until everyone's Page 8 of 31 Packet Clearing House

Appendix: P

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet from Key Ceremony 10



Appendix: Q

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet from Key Ceremony 11

DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script Friday, December 12, 2014

Re-Package OP Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
	CA places each OP card with pre-printed warning slip in its own new TEB and records the TEB # in the EW's copy of the smart card sign out sheet below, reading it aloud for verification and giving the TEB tear-off strip to the EW.	11	19:17

Re-Distribution of Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
	CA calls each CO to retrieve their smartcards. As each CO receives and inspects their cards, they verify, date and sign the EW's copy of the sign out sheet below and EW initials their entry.	1	19:19

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet

CO#	Card Type	TEB#	Printed Name	Signature	Date	Time	EW
CO1	OP 1 of 7	A28410734	Steve FELDMAN	han	12/12/14	19:17	1
CO2	OP 2 of 7	A 284/0735	Michael SINATRA	un BS	12/12/14	19:18	7
CO4	OP 4 of 7	A28410736	Eric ALLMAN	Sind Al	12/12/14	14:18	1

Optionally leave facility


Step	Activity	Initial	Time (UTC)
38	Optionally, all participants can now leave the room if the room is closed and sealed until everyone's return.	1	

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Appendix: R

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet from Key Ceremony 12



Appendix: S Boot-DVD Checksum from Key Ceremony 6

	SSEC Key Ceremony Script	Frid	ay, July 27, 201
16	CA opens a terminal window.	11	17:18
17	CA verifies the time zone, date, and time on the laptop and synchronizes it if necessary. Display the current time and timezone: date If the timezone is not set to UTC: cd /etc/ rm localtime ln -s /usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC localtime	7	17:20
	Set time to match the wall clock: date mmddHHMMYYYY Verify: date		
18	CA calculates sha256 checksum of the boot-DVD. CA may proceed with additional steps while this process completes. When the checksum is complete, CA reads it aloud, four digits at a time. sha256sum /dev/cdrom	1	[7:34
20 21	EW records the sixty-four digit boot-DVD checksum 7DF9 3 F9 C33D OFFF 9089 ABS6 3A3 8/26 208A 3ACI A789 38A7 B9C9 2A9F 52A F87 C Other participants may compare this with the boot-DVD checksum calculated during Key Ceremony 1, reproduced for convenience in the appendices of this document.	1	17:34
20	CA connects USB hub to laptop.	71	17:21
21	CA removes HSMFD KSK-HSM-01B-SJC from TEB and plugs into a free USB slot on the laptop; waits for O/S to recognize the FD. CA lets participants view contents of HSMFD then closes FD window.	Th	17:29

PCH DNS	SSEC Key	Ceremony	Entry/I	Exit Log
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Name	Enter	Exit	Initial	Time
ROBERT MARTIN-LÉGERE		X	7	10.09
_ ,) -	\times	\	B	1035
Eric Allanan		V	SA	12:22
Steve Feldman		1/	1328	1223
STERBAN SOMETI		/	8	1225
BILL WODEDEK		7	30	12:26
ROBERT WART WHEE	TE.	\nearrow		12:27
Larry Jordan		X		12:28
Robert Martin-Legar	3			1729
Brewonscon	\times		Tu	13:30
J. L.	X		14	13:30
-//				

PCH DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script Exception Form

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1	EW Describes exception and action here: We going to execute 53-54 before 48-52		20:48
2	EW notes date and time of key ceremony exception and signs here: Signature:	1/	20:48

^{*} End of DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script Exception *

PCH DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script Exception Form

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1	EW Describes exception and action here: Eric Allman and Stephan Somogyi left the Ceremony without Signing out	J	2:35pm
2	EW notes date and time of key ceremony exception and signs here: Signature:		

^{*} End of DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script Exception *

Participant Signature Sheet

O)		~					ge area	
Exit Time UTC	ている	12:129	於			21:26	1654 M:26	
Entry Time UTC	16,53	9,5,9/	95:91	(6.57	16.54	16,53 21:21	1654	
Date	Sept 25, 2015	Sept 25, 2015	Sept 25, 2015	Sept 25, 2015	Sept 25, 2015	Sept 25, 2015	Sept 25, 2015	
Identification Number	Î	2	1	***	2	, v	\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	
Form of Identification								
Signature	/		Perso	nally	ident	iffabl	e info	rmation redacted
Citizen								
Name	Robert MARTIN-LEGÈNE	Larry JORDAN	Steve FELDMAN	Eric ALLMAN	Stephan SOMOGYI	Bill WOODCOCK	Ashley JONES	
Role	CA1	EW.	8	CO4	502	SC1	Œ	

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sis.

PCH DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script Exception Form

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1	HSMFDTEB# A4128486 K1011866 BootDTEB# A28410729 LAPTOPTEB# A4128487		
2	EW notes date and time of key ceremony exception and signs here: Signature:	#	刀: 特S

^{*} End of DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script Exception *