

DNSSEC Key Ceremony Script Tuesday, April 26, 2011

Roles

- CA Ceremony Administrator
- IW Internal Witness
- EW External Witness
- SA System Administrator
- SC Security Controller
- FO Facility Operator

Other Abbreviations

- TEB Tamper Evident Bag (MMF Industries, item #2362010N20 small or #2362011N20 large)
- HSM Hardware Security Module
- FD Flash Drive
- AAK Adapter Authorization Key
- SMK Storage Master Key
- OP Operator
- SO Security Operator

Letter and Number Pronunciations

Character	Call Sign	Pronunciation
Α	Alfa	AL-FAH
В	Bravo	BRAH-VOH
С	Charlie	CHAR-LEE
D	Delta	DELL-TAH
E	Echo	ECK-OH
F	Foxtrot	FOKS-TROT
G	Golf	GOLF
н	Hotel	HOH-TEL
I	India	IN-DEE-AH
J	Juliet	JEW-LEE-ETT
К	Kilo	KEY-LOH
L	Lima	LEE-MAH
М	Mike	MIKE
Ν	November	NO-VEM-BER
0	Oscar	OSS-CAH
Р	Papa	PAH-PAH
Q	Quebec	KEH-BECK
R	Romeo	ROW-ME-OH
S	Sierra	SEE-AIR-RAH
т	Tango	TANG-GO
U	Uniform	YOU-NEE-FORM
V	Victor	VIK-TAH
W	Whiskey	WISS-KEY
Х	Xray	ECKS-RAY
Y	Yankee	YANG-KEY
Z	Zulu	Z00-L00
1	One	WUN
2	Two	ТОО
3	Three	TREE
4	Four	FOW-ER
5	Five	FIFE
6	Six	SIX
7	Seven	SEV-EN
8	Eight	AIT
9	Nine	NIN-ER
0	Zero	ZEE-RO

Participants

Role	Name	Citizen ship	Signature	Date	Entry Time UTC	Exit Time UTC
CA	Vicky SHRESTHA	NP		4/25/11		
EW	Larry JORDAN	US		4/25/11		
CO1	Steve FELDMAN	US		4/25/11		
CO2	Michael SINATRA	US		4/25/11		
СОЗ	Kim DAVIES	AU		4/25/11		
CO4	Jonny MARTIN	NZ		4/25/11		
CO5	Stephan SOMOGYI	СА		4/25/11		
CO6	LEONG Keng Thai	SG				
CO7	Gaurab UPADHAYA	NP				
SA FO	Peter ROWLAND	US		4/25/11		
sc	Bill WOODCOCK	US		4/25/11		
CA	Rick LAMB	US		4/25/11		

Note: Stephan SOMOGYI will be present for only the first portion of this ceremony, while LEONG Keng Thai and Gaurab UPADHAYA will not be present for any of this ceremony. Cryptographic components will be conveyed to these Crypto Officers after the ceremony.

Sign In to Key Management Facility

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1	FO logs identification of all participants before entering the Key Management Facility.		
2	FO collects cell phones, laptops, etc. Cameras are permitted in the Key Management Facility.		
3	EW verifies the identity of all participants by examining a government-issued photo identification, and distributes role identification placards.		

Emergency Evacuation Procedures

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
4	FO reviews emergency evacuation procedures and other relevant information with participants.		

Ground Rules

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
5	CA reviews ground rules and break procedures with participants.		

Verify Time and Date

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
6	EW reads aloud and records the date (month/day/year) and time (UTC) using an NTP-synchronized wall clock visible to all. Participants verify that the time is correct.		
	Date:		
	Time:		
	All entries into this script or any logs should follow this common source of time.		

Collect Equipment

Ste	ер	Activity	Initial	Time
7	7	CA collects HSM, boot-DVD, laptop, power supplies, cables, cards, etc. on table visible to all participants.		

Set Up Laptop

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
8	CA places boot-DVD and laptop on key ceremony table; connects laptop power and boots laptop from DVD.		
9	CA logs in as root.		
10	CA opens a terminal window.		
11	CA verifies the timezone, date, and time on the laptop and synchronizes it if necessary.		
	Display the current time and timezone: date		
	<pre>If the timezone is not set to UTC: cd /etc/ rm localtime ln -s /usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC localtime</pre>		
	Set time to match the wall clock: date mmddHHMMYYYY		
	Verify: date		
12	CA calculates sha256 checksum of the boot-DVD and reads it aloud, four digits at a time.		
13	EW records the sixty-four digit boot-DVD checksum		
14	CA connects USB hub to laptop.		
15	CA plugs blank flash disk (FD) labeled HSMFD into a free USB slot on the laptop (NOT on expander); waits for O/S to recognize the FD. CA lets participants view contents of HSMFD then closes FD window.		

Start Logging Terminal Session

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
16	CA changes the default directory to the HSMFD: cd /media/HSMFD		
17	CA starts capture of terminal output: script script-20110426.log		

Start Logging HSM Output

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
18	CA connects a serial to USB null modem cable to laptop USB expander. Please note that the first USB cable connected will be "ttyUSB0", the second will be "ttyUSB1" and so on.		
19	CA opens a second terminal screen and ensures its default directory is also /media/HSMFD and executes ttyaudit /dev/ttyUSB0		
	to start logging HSM serial port output. Note: DO NOT unplug USB serial port adaptor from laptop as this causes logging to stop.		

Initialize HSM1: ZSK-HSM-01-SJC

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
20	CA inspects the HSM1 TEB for tamper evidence; reads out TEB # and serial # while EW matches it with the prior script entry:		
	TEB# A3379433		
	Serial # K0705020		
21	CA removes HSM1 from TEB; discards TEB, labels HSM1 "ZSK-HSM-01-SJC" and plugs ttyUSB0 null modem serial cable to the back.		
22	CA connects power to HSM. Status information should appear on the serial logging screen and after self test the HSM display should say "Important Read Manual" indicating the HSM is in the initialized state.		

Make Security Officer (SO) Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
23	CA makes one set of the seven (7) Security Officer (SO) cards via "Issue Cards" from main menu (use '>' key to navigate menu) with "num req cards" equal 3 and total number "num cards" equal 7 using pre- labeled cards. Note: Default PIN="11223344". As each card is created the CA shows it to the participants and places it on table visible to the camera.		

Go Operational and Setup

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
24	CA sets the HSM operational ("Go Operational" on menu) using any three (3) SO cards. When presented with "Import config" press CLR button repeatedly until the "Set Online" menu item is reached. HSM date and time are not used in the ceremony. List SO cards used and order here (e.g., 2 of 7, 5 of 7) of 7 of 7 of 7		
25	CA then dumps the status of the HSM using the "Output Status" menu item (using '>' key).		
26	CA verifies settings below. If not set, CA may fix the settings with any three (3) SO cards using "API Setting" via "Key Mgmt" (eg, if LCD display shows "key import disable" this means key import is enabled. Click ENT to disable.). For auto online enable, use HSM Mgmt menu. Global Key Export Enabled App Key Import Enabled App Key Import Enabled Asymmetric Key Gen Enabled Symmetric Key Gen Enabled Symmetric Key Gen Enabled Signing Enabled Signature Verification Enabled MAC Gen Enabled Delete Asym Key Enabled Delete Sym Key Enabled Output Key Details Enabled Suite B Algorithms Enabled Non Suite B Algorithms Enabled FIPS Mode		

Make Adapter Authorization Key (AAK) Backup Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
27	CA makes one set of two (2) AAK backup cards while labeling them with "AAK", HSM serial number, and card number using any three (3) SO cards via the "Key Mgmt", "AAK", "Backup AAK", "num cards" = 2 menu items. CA presses CLR when done. As each card is created the CA shows it to the participants and places it on table visible to the camera. List SO cards used and order here (e.g., 2 of 7, 5 of 7) of 7 of 7		

Make Storage Master Key (SMK) Backup Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
28	CA makes one set of SMK backup cards on to pre- labeled smartcards. 5 (num req cards) of 7 (num cards) using any three (3) SO cards via the "Key Mgmt", "SMK", "Backup SMK" menu items. As each card is created the CA shows it to the participants and places it in on table visible to the camera. List SO cards used and order here (e.g., 2 of 7, 5 of 7)		
	of 7 of 7		
	of 7		
	(Note: SO cards may not be needed if this step is performed shortly after prior key management operation)		

Make Operator (OP) Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
29	CA makes one set of the seven (7) Operator (OP) cards using pre-labeled smartcards with number needed (num req cards) equal 3 and total number (num cards) equal 7 using any three (3) SO cards via the "HSM Mgmt" menu and "Issue Cards". CA presses CLR key to return to main menu. Note: Default PIN="11223344". As each card is created the CA shows it to the participants and places it on table visible to the camera. List SO cards used and order here (e.g., 2 of 7, 5 of 7)		
	of 7		
	of 7		
	of 7		
	(Note: SO cards may not be needed if this step is performed shortly after prior key management operation)		

Activate HSM1

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
30	CA sets HSM1 online ("Set Online" menu item) using any three (3) OP cards. The "Ready" LED should go on. List SO cards used and order here (e.g., 2 of 7, 5 of 7)		
	of 7		
	of 7		
	of 7		
	(Note: Alternatively CA may just press RESTART which should put HSM online after self test.)		

Check Network Connectivity Between Laptop and HSM1

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
31	CA connects HSM to laptop using Ethernet cable.		
32	CA tests network connectivity between laptop and HSM by entering ping 192.168.0.2 on the laptop terminal window and looking for responses. Ctrl-C to exit program.		

Initialize HSM1 Configuration and Files

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
33	CA executes . /opt/dnssec/fixenv to set environment variables for HSM then runs inittoken entering 0 for Slot ZSK-HSM-01 for PKCS11 Token name 123456 for SO PIN and 123456 for USER PIN. This should return Token initialized OK.		
34	CA executes inittoken entering 1 for Slot KSK-HSM-01 for PKCS11 Token name 123456 for SO PIN and 123456 for USER PIN. This should return Token initialized OK.		

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
35	CA executes inittoken entering 2 for Slot RZSK-HSM-01 for PKCS11 Token name 123456 for SO PIN and 123456 for USER PIN. This should return Token initialized OK.		
36	CA executes inittoken entering 3 for Slot RKSK-HSM-01 for PKCS11 Token name 123456 for SO PIN and 123456 for USER PIN. This should return Token initialized OK.		

Create Wrapping Keys for Key Backup

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
37	CA executes makewrapkeys Which should result in the creation of wrapping keys in each slot. CA verifies contents of HSM1 by executing Showallkeys		
38	CA places HSM offline using any 3 OP cards via the "set offline" menu item. List OP cards used and order here (e.g., 2 of 7, 5 of 7) of 7 of 7 of 7		
39	CA makes a backup of the wrapping keys via the Key Mgmt, App Key, Backup App Key, "all keys", "backup keys" menu items using any 3 SO cards and inserting an APP smartcard (labeled APP 1) when requested. If asked to override, affirm by pressing "ENT" key. List SO cards used and order here (e.g., 2 of 7, 5 of 7) of 7 of 7		
40	CA repeats the above step a second time, making a backup of the wrapping keys using the same 3 SO cards and inserting an APP smartcard (labeled APP 2) when requested. If asked to override, affirm by pressing "ENT" key.		
41	CA repeats the above step a second time, making a backup of the wrapping keys using the same 3 SO cards and inserting an APP smartcard (labeled APP 3) when requested. If asked to override, affirm by pressing "ENT" key.		
42	CA makes a backup of the HSM config files linked to these APP cards by executing: tar zcf hsmbaseconfig20110426.tar.gz *.db		

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
43	CA plugs a blank FD labeled HSMDB into a spare USB slot and waits for O/S to recognize drive. Once recognized, CA copies *.db files linked with the APP cards just created to the new blank FD by executing: cp -p *.db /opt/dnssec/machine /media/ HSMDB ls -lt /media/HSMDB CA then un-mounts HSMDB by executing umount /media/HSMDB and remove FD		
44	CA repeats above step a second time, placing the completed backup flash drive alongside the APP cards. These will later be packaged together for safekeeping.		
45	CA repeats above step a third time, placing the completed backup flash drive alongside the APP cards. These will later be packaged together for safekeeping.		
46	CA presses RESTART button on HSM. After self test completes, Ready LED should be lit indicating HSM is configured for auto-online mode.		
47	CA executes showallkeys to do a final check on the HSM before transport to San Jose.		
48	Via the HSM Mgmt, "Set Network", "IP Address" menu items the CA changes the HSM network configuration to IP address 192.168.100.2 to correspond with the signer configuration using any 3 SO cards. Each byte of the IP address is entered as 3 digits, i.e., 2 = 002, and must be entered even if already displaying correct value. Once this is complete, press "ENT". List SO cards used and order here (e.g., 2 of 7, 5 of 7) of 7 of 7		
	of 7 CA verifies IP address settings by pressing RESTART and reviewing network settings via the View Network and IP address menu items.		

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
49	CA disconnects Ethernet and serial connection from HSM and unplugs power from unit and places it inside a new TEB.		
50	CA reads out TEB # and HSM serial #, shows item to participants.		
51	EW records TEB # and HSM serial # here. TEB #		
52	The HSM will be transported by at least two trusted		
	persons to the signer facility for installation.		

Initialize HSM2 : KSK-HSM-01-SJC

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
53	CA inspects the HSM2 TEB for tamper evidence; reads out TEB # and serial # while EW matches it with the prior script entry:		
	TEB # A3379385		
	Serial # K0911004		
54	CA removes HSM2 from TEB; discards TEB, labels HSM2 "KSK-HSM-01-SJC" and plugs the null modem serial cable to the back.		
55	CA connects power to HSM. Status information should appear on the serial logging screen and after self test the HSM display should say "Important Read Manual" indicating the HSM is in the initialized state.		

Import Adapter Authorization Key (AAK)

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
56	CA imports AAK using the HSM main menu "Restore AAK" and AAK cards. Once imported, press CLR.		

Go Operational and Setup

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
57	CA sets the HSM operational ("Go Operational" on menu) using any three (3) SO cards. When presented with "Import config" press CLR button repeatedly until you reach the "Set Online" menu item. List SO cards used and order here (e.g., 2 of 7, 5 of 7) of 7 of 7 of 7		
58	CA dumps the status of the HSM via the "Output Status" menu item (using '>' key).		

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
59	Activity CA verifies settings below. If not set, CA may fix the settings using "API Setting" via "Key Mgmt" (eg, if LCD display shows "key import, disable" this means key import is enabled. Click ENT to disable). For auto online disable, use HSM Mgmt menu. Global Key Export Enabled App Key Import Enabled App Key Export Enabled App Key Export Enabled Symmetric Key Gen Enabled Symmetric Key Gen Enabled Signing Enabled Signature Verification Enabled MAC Gen Enabled MAC Ver Enabled Delete Asym Key Enabled Delete Sym Key Enabled Output Key Details Enabled Suite B Algorithms Enabled	Initial	Time
	Non Suite B Algorithms Enabled AES SMK Auto Online Disabled		
	FIPS Mode		

Erasing the Adapter Authorization Key (AAK) Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
60	CA erases the two AAK cards using any three (3) of a set of SO cards via "Key Mgmt", "AAK", "Clear Card", "# Cards" menu items. CA then puts cards into a new TEB and seals placing TEB on table. List SO cards used and order here (e.g., 2 of 7, 5 of 7)		
	of 7		
	of 7		
	of 7		
	CA reads out TEB #; shows item to participants and EW records TEB # here.		
	TEB #		

Import Storage Master Key (SMK)

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
61	CA imports SMK from HSM1 using any 5 of the 7 SMK cards and any three (3) SO cards via the "Key Mgmt", "SMK", "Restore" menu item List SO cards used and order here (e.g., 2 of 7, 5 of 7)		
	of 7		
	of 7		
	of 7		
	List SMK cards used and order here.		
	of 7		

Import the Wrapping Keys

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
62	CA imports the wrapping keys from HSM1 using any APP card and any three (3) SO cards via the "Key Mgmt", "APP", "Restore" menu item. If a second card is requested hit "CLR". List SO cards used and order here (e.g., 2 of 7, 5 of 7) of 7 of 7 APP card number		

Testing HSM2

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
63	CA sets HSM online ("Set Online" menu item) using any three (3) OP cards. The "Ready" LED should go on. List OP cards used and order here (e.g., 2 of 7, 5 of 7) of 7 of 7		
	of 7		
64	CA connects HSM to laptop using Ethernet cable that was previously connected to HSM1.		
65	CA tests network connectivity between laptop and HSM by entering ping 192.168.0.2 on the laptop terminal window. Control-C to exit program.		
66	CA executes showallkeys to check.		

Generate KSKs and ZSKs

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
67	CA starts generation of RSA 2048bit and 1024bit keys inside the HSM by executing bulkgen		
	This will take approximately 15sec/2048bit key and 3sec/1024bit key.		
	(Note: Crypto Officers, Security Controllers, and System Administrators are not necessary during this step.)		

Package APP Cards and HSMDB Flash Drives

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
68	CA places one of the backup HSMDB FDs and APP 1 card in a TEB and seals.		
69	CA reads out TEB #; shows item to participants and EW records TEB # here.		
	TEB #		
70	CA places one of the backup HSMDB FDs and APP 2 card in a TEB and seals.		
71	CA reads out TEB #; shows item to participants and EW records TEB # here.		
	TEB #		
72	CA places one of the backup HSMDB FDs and APP 3 card in a TEB and seals.		
73	CA reads out TEB #; shows item to participants and EW records TEB # here.		
	TEB #		

Package SMK Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
74	CA places each SMK card with an instruction slip indicating the ownership and disposition of the card in its own new TEB and records the number in the Smart Card Sign Out Sheet.		

Package SO Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
75	CA places each SO card with instruction slip in its own new TEB and records the number in the smart card sign out sheet below.		

Backup of KSKs and ZSKs


Step	Activity	Initial	Time
76	CA creates encrypted backups of the ZSKs by executing zskbackup After the key ceremony, this file will be transferred to the signer where it will be imported into the HSM.		
77	CA similarly does this for the KSKs by executing kskbackup This file will not be imported by the signer HSM and is kept for backup purposes only.		

Generate Signed DNSKEY RRsets

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
78	CA generates KSK signed DNSKEY RRsets (keybundles) by executing the script for a pre- determined set of domains as follows: cd /tmp mkdir kb cd kb cp -p /opt/dnssec/aep.hsmconfig . keybundle-generate tar zcf /media/HSMFD/20110426.kb.tar.gz . cd /media/HSMFD	mua	
	This will create time sensitive archive files of the form date.domain.keybundle.tar.gz that must be copied to the on-line signer in a timely manner after completion of the key ceremony.		

Package OP Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
79	CA places each OP card with instruction slip in its own new TEB and records the number in the smart card sign out sheet below.		



Return HSM2 to a Tamper Evident Bag

Step	Activity	Time	
80	CA presses RESTART button and waits for self test to complete.		
81	CA disconnects HSM from power and laptop (serial and Ethernet) if connected, placing HSM into a new TEB and seals.		
82	CA reads out TEB # and HSM serial #, shows item to participants.		
83	EW records TEB # and HSM serial # here.		
	TEB #		
	HSM serial #		

Stop Recording Serial Port Activity

Ste	Activity	Initial	Time
84	CA terminates HSM serial output capture by disconnecting USB serial adaptors from laptop. CA then exits out of serial output terminal window.		

Backup HSM Flash Drive Contents

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
85	CA displays contents of HSMFD by executing ls -lt		
86	CA plugs a blank FD labeled HSMFD into the laptop waits for it to be recognized by the O/S as HSMFD_ and copies the contents of the HSMFD to the blank drive for backup by executing cp -Rp * /media/HSMFD_		
87	CA displays contents of HSMFD_ by executing ls -lt /media/HSMFD_		
88	CA unmounts new FD using umount /media/HSMFD_		
89	CA removes HSMFD_ and places on table		
90	CA repeats the first four steps of this activity a second time, to create a second backup.		
91	CA repeats the first four steps of this activity a third time, to create a third backup.		
92	CA repeats the first four steps of this activity a fourth time, to create a fourth backup.		

Stop Logging Terminal Output

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
93	CA stops logging terminal output by entering "exit" in remaining terminal window		

Return HSM FD to a Tamper Evident Bag

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
94	CA unmounts HSMFD by executing cd /tmp then umount /media/HSMFD		
95	CA removes HSMFD and places it in new TEB and seals; reads out TEB # and shows item to participants.		
96	EW records TEB # and HSM serial # here.		
	TEB #		
	HSM serial #		

Return Boot-DVD to a Tamper Evident Bag

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
97	After all print jobs are complete, CA executes shutdown -hP now removes DVD and turns off laptop.		
98	CA places boot-DVD in new TEB and seals; reads out TEB # and shows item to participants.		
99	EW records TEB # and HSM serial # here.		
	TEB #		
	HSM serial #		

Return Laptop to a Tamper Evident Bag

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
100	CA disconnects power, and any other connections from laptop and puts laptop in new TEB and seals; reads out TEB #; shows item to participants.		
101	EW records TEB # and HSM serial # here.		
	TEB #		
	HSM serial #		

Return Power Supplies, USB Hub, and Cables to Cart

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
102	CA places HSM and laptop power supplies, USB hub, USB serial adapter, power and networking cables in a bag. This need not be a TEB as it is only used for convenient packaging.		
	This, APP 1 card TEB, erased AAK card TEB, and the above items will be stored in the bank safe deposit box controlled by the SSC. There the SSC will record return of each item on the safe log with TEB #, printed name, date, time, and signature with a second party initialing each entry.		
	The remaining APP 2 and APP 3 TEBs will be kept in a secure container in the PCH office.		

Distribute Cards

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
103	Due to limited number of personnel at this key ceremony, cards will be distributed in groups that maintain multi-person control requirements. A subsequent key ceremony will redistribute cards to their final holders. Each group of cards shall be placed in another TEB whose numbers are recorded below on the EW's script.		
104	SMK1, SO1, OP1		
	TEB# go to CO1, Steve FELDMAN.		
105	SMK5, SO5, OP5		
	TEB# are entrusted to CO1, Steve FELDMAN, for conveyance to CO5, Stephan SOMOGYI.		
106	SMK2, SO2, OP2		
	TEB# go to CO2, Michael SINATRA.		
107	SMK3, SO3, OP3		
	TEB# go to CO3, Kim DAVIES.		
108	SMK6, SO6, OP6		
	TEB# are entrusted to CO3, Kim DAVIES, for conveyance to CO6, LEONG Keng Thai.		
109	SMK 4, SO4, OP4		
	TEB# go to CO4, Jonny MARTIN.		
110	SMK7, SO7, OP7		
	TEB# are entrusted to CO4, Jonny MARTIN, for conveyance to CO7, Gaurab UPADHAYA.		

Smart Card Sign Out Sheet

CO#	Card Type	TEB #	Printed Name	Signature	Date	Time	EW
CO1	OP 1 of 7		Steve FELDMAN		4/25/11		
CO1	SO 1 of 7		Steve FELDMAN		4/25/11		
CO1	SMK 1 of 7		Steve FELDMAN		4/25/11		
CO2	OP 2 of 7		Michael SINATRA		4/25/11		
CO2	SO 2 of 7		Michael SINATRA		4/25/11		
CO2	SMK 2 of 7		Michael SINATRA		4/25/11		
СОЗ	OP 3 of 7		Kim DAVIES		4/25/11		
СОЗ	SO 3 of 7		Kim DAVIES		4/25/11		
СОЗ	SMK 3 of 7		Kim DAVIES		4/25/11		
CO4	OP 4 of 7		Jonny MARTIN		4/25/11		
CO4	SO 4 of 7		Jonny MARTIN		4/25/11		
CO4	SMK 4 of 7		Jonny MARTIN		4/25/11		
CO5	OP 5 of 7		Steve FELDMAN		4/25/11		
CO5	SO 5 of 7		Steve FELDMAN		4/25/11		
CO5	SMK 5 of 7		Steve FELDMAN		4/25/11		
CO6	OP 6 of 7		Kim DAVIES		4/25/11		
CO6	SO 6 of 7		Kim DAVIES		4/25/11		
CO6	SMK 6 of 7		Kim DAVIES		4/25/11		
C07	OP 7 of 7		Jonny MARTIN		4/25/11		
C07	SO 7 of 7		Jonny MARTIN		4/25/11		
C07	SMK 7 of 7		Jonny MARTIN		4/25/11		

Participant Sign-Out on External Witness' Script

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
111	All participants sign EW's script coversheet, and note their exit time.		
112	CA reviews EW's script and signs it.		
	CA Signature:		

Sign Out of Key Management Facility

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
113	FO returns phones, laptops, and other items to participants and logs their exit.		

Stop Audio-Visual Recording

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
114	SA stops audio and video recording.		

Copy and Store the Script

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
115	EW makes at least 5 copies of his or her script: one for off-site audit bundle, one for on-site audit bundle, one for EW, and copies for other participants, as requested. Audit bundles each contain 1) output of signer system - HSMFD; 2) copy of EW's key ceremony script; 3) audio-visual recording; 4) logs from the Facility Physical Access Control; 5) SA attestation (A.2 below); and 6) the EW attestation (A.1 below) - all in a TEB labeled "Key Ceremony 4", dated and signed by EW and CA. One bundle will be stored by the SC along with equipment in bank safe deposit box. The second bundle will be kept securely at PCH's office.		

All remaining participants sign out of ceremony room log and leave.

Notes

From the Audit Bundle Checklist Document:

1. Output of Signer System (CA)

One electronic copy (physical flash drive) of the HSMFD in each audit bundle, each placed within a tamper-evident bag, labeled, dated and signed by the CA and the EW

2. Key Ceremony Scripts (EW)

Hard copies of the EW's key ceremony scripts, including the EW's notes and the EW's attestation. See Appendix A.1.

3. Audio-visual recordings from the key ceremony (SA)

4. Logs from the Physical Access Control and Intrusion Detection System (SA)

One electronic copy (physical flash drive) of the firewall configuration, the screenshots from the PAC-IDS configuration review, the list of the enrolled users, the event log file and the configuration audit log file in each audit bundle, each placed in a tamper-evident bag, labeled, dated and signed by the SA and the EW

5. Configuration review of the Physical Access Control and Intrusion Detection System (SA)

SA's attestation and hard copies of the screen shots and configuration audit log from the review process. See Appendix A.2.

6. Configuration review of the Firewall System (SA)

SA's attestation and hard copies of the firewall configuration from the review process. See Appendix A.3.

Appendix A.1:

Key Ceremony Script

(by EW)

I hereby attest that the Key Ceremony was conducted in accordance with this script and any exceptions which may have occurred were accurately and properly documented.

Printed Name:

Signature: _____

Date: _____

Appendix A.2:

Access Control System Configuration Review (by SA)

I have reviewed the physical access control system and not found any discrepancies or anything else out of the ordinary.

Enclosed is the audited physical access log.

Printed Name: _____

Signature:

Date: _____